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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2164 
 ___________ 
 
 ISSA ABDEL JABBAR,  
   Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,  
     Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A041-665-023) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 26, 2012 
 Before:  SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and WEIS, Circuit 
  
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: January 2, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Petitioner Bahjat Issa Abdel Jabbar, a citizen of Jordan, has been convicted of two 
criminal offenses.  In 1995, he pleaded guilty to one count of criminal sexual contact.  
Administrative Record (A.R.) 153–54.  In 2006, Jabbar was charged with various 
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sexually based offenses, ultimately pleading guilty to one count of third-degree 
endangering of the welfare of a child, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a).  A.R. 
116.  The background of the crime was revealed in the plea colloquy: Jabbar masturbated 
in front of a minor, knowing that he would “debauch the morals” of the minor.  A.R. 121. 
In 2011, Jabbar was charged with removability on the basis of 1) his conviction of 
an aggravated felony for violating “a law relating to murder, rape[,] or sexual abuse of a 
minor,” and 2) his conviction of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs).  A.R. 
190; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii).  He contested both charges, but the 
Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained them.  See A.R. 11–14.  The Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) affirmed, holding that: 1) under the modified categorical approach of 
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), the second conviction was an aggravated 
felony; and 2) both offenses were CIMTs.  A.R. 4–5.  The BIA deemed it unnecessary to 
determine whether the first offense was an aggravated felony, and noted that Jabbar 
“d[id] not otherwise appear eligible for any form of relief from removal.”  A.R. 5.  This 
timely petition for review followed.1
                                                 
1  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review whether Jabbar’s offenses 
were CIMTs or aggravated felonies.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Singh v. Att’y Gen., 
677 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012); Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 274–75 (3d Cir. 
2008).  We do so de novo, “though our review is subject to the principles of deference 
articulated in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).”  
Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
“Because the BIA did not summarily affirm the IJ’s order but instead issued a separate 
opinion, we review the BIA’s disposition and look to the IJ’s ruling only insofar as the 
BIA deferred to it.”  Id. 
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 At the outset, we note that Jabbar will prevail only if the agency erred in both of 
its primary determinations: that he was convicted of an aggravated felony and of two 
CIMTs.  We conclude that his second offense was an “aggravated felony” and need not 
reach the issue of CIMTs.2
Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an “aggravated felony” is 
defined as, inter alia, a conviction for “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A); 
   
see also Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Jabbar argues that “Endangering the Welfare of Children,” the umbrella crime of 
conviction, “is a confounding statute in that it prohibits a large variety of behaviors under 
one section of statute.”  Pet’r’s Br. 31.  He insists that the specific subsection under 
which he was convicted, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a),3 is not covered by the definition of 
“aggravated felony” recited above.  Pet’r’s Br. 34.  Jabbar also relies on Stubbs v. 
Attorney General
                                                 
2  Jabbar’s status as an aggravated felon also renders him ineligible for cancellation of 
removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).  
, 452 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2006), for the proposition that convictions under 
 
3  This pertinent portion of the statute reads: 
 
Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who has assumed responsibility 
for the care of a child who engages in sexual conduct which would impair or debauch the 
morals of the child . . . is guilty of a crime of the second degree. Any other person who 
engages in conduct or who causes harm as described in this subsection to a child under 
the age of 16 is guilty of a crime of the third degree. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(a).  Since Jabbar was convicted of the third-degree offense, his 
conduct falls under the “any other person” subpart above.  
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§ 2C:24-4(a) are categorically not of a kind with “sexual abuse of a minor.”  Pet’r’s Br. 
34 (citing Stubbs
 We do not agree.  For starters, 
, 452 F.3d at 256).  
Stubbs does not stand for the overarching principle 
that Jabbar ascribes to it.  Jerome Stubbs did indeed plead guilty to the same charge 
levied against Jabbar, and the charging document in that case also used much of the same 
language.  See Stubbs, 452 F.3d at 252.  Observing that the statute in question covered a 
variety of offenses, we concluded that departure from the “categorical approach” was 
appropriate and that the BIA therefore properly referred to the charging document in 
reaching its conclusion.  Id. at 253–54.  We further decided, however, that the record 
before the agency did not support equating Stubbs’s conviction with “sexual abuse of a 
minor” under the INA’s aggravated felony definition.  Id.
 The key distinction between 
 at 255–56. 
Stubbs and the present case, and one that Jabbar 
overlooks, is that Stubbs took place in a factual vacuum; all that was within the grasp of 
this Court and the agency was the charging document.  In the case at hand, by contrast, 
the transcript of the formal plea colloquy4 establishes that Jabbar pleaded guilty to 
masturbating in front of a fifteen-year-old boy in a vehicle during the wee hours of the 
morning.  See A.R. 121.  Thus, unlike in Stubbs
                                                 
4  The formal plea colloquy may be consulted under the modified categorical approach.  
See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 163 (3d Cir. 2004) 
, we are certain that an incident with a 
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minor “actually occurred.”  Stubbs, 452 F.3d 251 at 256.5
 Jabbar also argues that the BIA’s analysis was faulty because his offense did not 
“involve” the minor, who was at most a passive observer.  Pet’r’s Br. 37.  This contention 
is forestalled by 
  
In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc), 
in which the BIA squarely held that the alien’s offense—indecently exposing himself 
with the knowledge that a child was present with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of 
“any person”—constituted “sexual abuse of a minor.”  Id. at 993.  The BIA further 
emphasized that contact was not a required element of sexual abuse, id. at 996.  We have 
determined that Rodriguez-Rodriguez is a reasonable interpretation of the INA and is 
entitled to Chevron deference.  See Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 796.  If “indecent exposure in 
the presence of a child by one intent on sexual arousal is clearly sexual abuse of a minor,” 
Rodriguez-Rodriguez
 Thus, Jabbar’s second offense meets the definition of a “sexual abuse of a minor” 
aggravated felony under the INA.  Because the BIA’s decision is supportable on that 
basis alone, we need venture no further; the petition for review will be denied.  The 
Government’s motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction is denied as well. 
, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996, it follows that masturbation in front of a 
minor by one intent on sexual arousal must also be so.     
                                                 
5  The BIA relied on one of our nonprecedential decisions in which we reached the same 
conclusion.  See generally Ramirez v. Att’y Gen., 376 F. App’x 225 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Jabbar argues that the BIA’s reliance on that decision was improper, but it was at most 
unnecessary because our conclusion flows from existing precedent. 
